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Stable Provision vs. Cournot–Nash Equilibria in Pure Public Good Economies
Authors:Benyamin Shitovitz,&   Menahem Spiegel
Affiliation:Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Israel,;Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Israel, and Department of Finance and Economics, Rutgers University, Newark, NJ, USA
Abstract:Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998, Journal of Economic Theory 83 , pp. 1–18) demonstrated that in pure public good economies, for some consumers the Lindahl consumption bundles can be inferior (utility-wise) to their Cournot–Nash allocation. In this paper, we prove that in any finite pure public good economy there exists a core allocation that is unanimously preferred, utility-wise, by all consumers over their Cournot–Nash consumption bundles.
Keywords:
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