| 我国金融类上市公司高管薪酬激励机制实证分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 韩克勇. 我国金融类上市公司高管薪酬激励机制实证分析[J]. 财经理论与实践, 2012, 33(3): 117-120 |
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| 作者姓名： | 韩克勇 |
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| 作者单位： | 山西省社会科学院,山西太原,030006 |
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| 摘 要： | 采用面板数据模型对我国整体金融类上市公司高管薪酬进行分析,并以银行业作为子样本进行具体探讨,结果表明我国金融类上市公司高管薪酬形式单一且基本上与经营业绩相联系,为此,应对银行业的高管薪酬应加强监管。
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| 关 键 词： | 金融类上市公司 高管薪酬 激励机制 面板数据模型 |
Empirical Study of Compensation Incentive Mechanism of Listed Financial Companies |
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| HAN Ke yong. Empirical Study of Compensation Incentive Mechanism of Listed Financial Companies[J]. The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics, 2012, 33(3): 117-120 |
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| Authors: | HAN Ke yong |
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| Affiliation: | HAN Ke-yong (Shanxi Academy of Social sciences,Taiyuan,Shanxi 030006,China) |
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| Abstract: | Scientific compensation incentive mechanism is playing an important role to improve firms performances and promote economic growth.Empirical study has been done on the compensation incentive mechanism of listed financial companies by panal data model.The results show that the compensation incentive plans in finance industry are simple as,usually,the compensation connecting with sales performance.The supervision of the managers’ compensation in banking sector should be strengthened. |
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| Keywords: | Listed financial companies Managers’ compensation Incentive mechanism Panel-data model |
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