Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games |
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Authors: | Franç oise Forges,Enrico Minelli |
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Affiliation: | Françoise Forges,Enrico Minelli, |
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Abstract: | Amechanismfor a Bayesian gameGis a mapping μ from the set of states of nature to the set of players' actions. μ isself-fulfillingif players are truthful at the communication stage and, given the information revealed by μ, no player can gain in unilaterally deviating from the action prescribed by the mechanism. We investigate the properties of self-fulfilling mechanisms and we show in particular that they correspond to inert solutions of the infinitely repeated game generated byG. We also discuss applications to market games, regulation, and R&D games.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D82, C72. |
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Keywords: | communication equilibrium Nash equilibrium |
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