Incentives for sales agents after the advent of the internet |
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Authors: | Christian M. Pfeil Thorsten Posselt Nils Maschke |
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Affiliation: | 1. University of Wuppertal, Gau?str. 20, 42097, Wuppertal, Germany
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Abstract: | E-commerce has siphoned sales away from bricks-and-mortar channels in many industries. Taking a principal-agent perspective, this article analyzes how the increasing volume of e-sales influences offline incentive schemes and firm profitability. According to the proposed model, moderate channel cannibalization can be a blessing in disguise if it decreases incentive intensity and lowers expected wage payments. Whether a larger volume of e-sales is blessing or curse depends (among other things) on the relative magnitude of cannibalization versus market enlargement and the degree to which the increase changes the composition of offline customers’ types with respect to service costs. |
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Keywords: | Sales agents Incentive scheme Channel competition Online and offline distribution Principal-agent theory E-commerce |
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