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零售商亏损诱饵策略及其竞争效应
引用本文:赵玻,何莉娟.零售商亏损诱饵策略及其竞争效应[J].财贸研究,2006,17(2):47-51.
作者姓名:赵玻  何莉娟
作者单位:1. 安徽财经大学,国际经贸学院,安徽,蚌埠,233041
2. 西南财经大学,语言文化学院,四川,成都,610074
基金项目:安徽财经大学校科研和校改项目
摘    要:在同一店铺中,零售商经营的所有商品之间形成了互补性的需求关系,这为零售商实施亏损诱饵策略创造了条件。零售商实施亏损诱饵策略不仅可以实现利润最大化,还可以获取竞争优势。从长期来看,亏损诱饵策略可能对零售商和制造商都具有反竞争效应。对反托拉斯当局来讲,严格区分亏损诱饵和高弹性商品、知名品牌以及销售速度较快产品的正常价格是必要的。

关 键 词:零售商  亏损诱饵  竞争效应
收稿时间:2006-01-13
修稿时间:2006-01-13

Retailers' Loss-Leader Strategy and Its Competition Effects
ZHAO Bo,HE Li-juan.Retailers'''' Loss-Leader Strategy and Its Competition Effects[J].Finance and Trade Research,2006,17(2):47-51.
Authors:ZHAO Bo  HE Li-juan
Institution:1. Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233041 ;2, South Western University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 610074
Abstract:There are mutually complementary demanding relations among all merchandises of a retailer in a store, which is the base of loss-leader strategy for the retailer. The retailer not only realizes maximum profits, but also acquires competition advantages through loss-leader strategy. In the longer term, loss-leader strategy may have destructive competition effects on both the retailer and the manufacturer. It is necessary to distinguish the loss leader from the normal pricing of a high-elasticity, strongly-branded, fast-selling product for the antitrust bureaucracy.
Keywords:retailers  loss-leader strategy  competition effects
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