| 我国假文凭的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 崔爱平. 我国假文凭的博弈分析[J]. 华东经济管理, 2004, 18(3): 40-42 |
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| 作者姓名： | 崔爱平 |
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| 作者单位： | 南昌大学,经济与管理学院,江西,南昌,330047 |
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| 摘 要： | 假文凭现象已经引起社会的高度关注,其泛滥给社会造成极大的危害。本文从博弈论的角度分析与假文凭相关的利益主体的行为决策,并从中寻找根本解决假文凭问题的对策。
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| 关 键 词： | 假文凭 博弈 纳什均衡 政府行为 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-5097(2004)03-0040-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-01-26 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-01-26 |
Games analysis on the phenomenon of the fake diploma in China |
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| CUI Ai-ping,GAN Xiao-qing. Games analysis on the phenomenon of the fake diploma in China[J]. East China Economic Management, 2004, 18(3): 40-42 |
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| Authors: | CUI Ai-ping GAN Xiao-qing |
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| Affiliation: | Economy and Management College,Nanchang University, Nanchang 330047,China) |
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| Abstract: | In our country, the fake diploma becomes a serious societal problem. The overflow of it results in bad effect greatly. In this paper, the behaviors and strategies of subjects concerned with the fake diploma have been discussed with game models. Measures based on analysis to solve the problem of the fake diploma have been put forward. |
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| Keywords: | fake diploma game nash equilibrium government behavior |
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