Structural estimation of a principal-agent model: moral hazard in medical insurance |
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Authors: | Vera-Hernández Marcos |
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Affiliation: | University College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies, UK. marcos.vera@ifs.org.uk. |
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Abstract: | Despite the importance of principal-agent models in the development of modern economic theory, there are few estimations of these models. I recover the estimates of a principal-agent model and obtain an approximation to the optimal contract. The results show that out-of-pocket payments follow a concave profile with respect to costs of treatment. I estimate the welfare loss due to moral hazard, taking into account income effects. I also propose a new measure of moral hazard based on the conditional correlation between contractible and noncontractible variables. |
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