首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Bankable emission permits under uncertainty and optimal risk-management rules
Authors:Julien Chevallier  Johanna Etner  Pierre-André Jouvet
Institution:aCGEMP-LEDa, University Paris Dauphine, France;bCERSES, University Paris Descartes, France;cEconomiX, University of Paris Ouest and Climate Economics Chair, France
Abstract:This article proposes a theory of banking of emission permits under conditions of regulatory uncertainty. Based on a two-period partial equilibrium framework, we examine the effects of increasing risk–in the sense of a mean preserving spread–regarding a future permit allocation at the firm level. We also examine the role of an agency to pool risks by re-allocating permits for a group of firms. Our results are twofold. First, an increase in risk may lead to changes in a firm’s banking strategy, depending on the third partial derivative of its production function with respect to pollution. Second, we define an optimal risk-sharing rule between agents to respond to political decision changes. Our results overall suggest that the bankability of permits may be used as a risk-management tool.
Keywords:Emission permits  Banking  Uncertainty  Policy risk
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号