| 摘 要： | ![]()
在传统社会中,为保护创新成果,人们通常只能将其保留为技术机密或他人无法共享的私有知识,这不但降低了创新效率,也会增加技术的失传风险.有识于此,本文将专利看做政府向创新者提供的一种机密交换契约,并借此论证了引入"事后"专利保护的合理性:人们为了要获得排他性的专利保护,就必须将其私有知识公开披露,而这消除了技术失传风险.但只有当专利利润高于商业机密利润时人们才会申请专利,故专利保护会导致更大的垄断扭曲.社会最优专利期限就是在机密失传风险和垄断定价扭曲之间权衡的结果,只要存在技术失传风险,事后最优专利期限就必须是正的.In?a?traditional?society?innovations?were?often?held?as?secrecy,?i.?e.?,?private?knowledge?that?can?not?be?shared?by?others.?This?approach?not?only?lowers?social?efficiency,?but?also?leads?to?the?risk?of?technology?oblivion.?Based?on?this?observation,?we?offer?a?novel?justification?of?"ex?post"?patent?protection.?In?order?to?obtain?exclusive?patent?protection,?innovators?have?to?disclose?their?technological?knowledge?to?the?public.?This?approach?eliminates?oblivion?risks.?However,?patent?protection?may?lead?to?more?deadweight?loss?because?an?innovator?would?not?apply?a?patent?unless?the?profit?from?doing?that?is?higher,?i.?e.?,?unless?the?patent?duration?is?longer?than?the?expected?duration?of?the?secrecy.?The?optimal?patent?policy?in?our?model,?therefore,?results?from?the?tradeoff?between?oblivion?risk?and?monopoly?distortion.?The?optimal?patent?protection?should?be?positive?as?long?as?oblivion?risk?exists.?We?also?discuss?how?some?parameters?affect?the?optimal?patent?policy.
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