不完全信息下外汇市场上的投机攻击博弈

伴随着经济全球化和金融自由化的发展,外汇市场上的游戏规则产生了显而易见的变化,投机资本规模迅速膨胀,羊群效应也愈发严重,对一国汇率的稳定形成严重挑战。文章从博弈论的角度出发,构造不完全信息下投机资本攻击一国汇率的博弈模型,揭示投机者进行投机攻击决策的依据和博弈中货币当局败北的原因,创造性地提出“抗投机攻击指数”概念,用以判断一国外汇市场的稳定。

Speculative Attack Game Models of Foreign Exchange market under Incomplete Information

With the development of globalization of economy and liberalization of finance, the game rule of foreign exchange market changes obviously. The force of speculative capital is growing rapidly, and the herd effect grows in intensity. This article constructs two game models under incomplete information to reveal the decision - making foundation of international speculator and the defeat reason of currency authority, and creates the conception of resist - speculation index to estimate the stabilization of forgn exchange market.