A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set |
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Authors: | Cheng-Cheng Hu |
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Affiliation: | Department of Economics, National Cheng Kung University, 1 University Rd., Tainan 701, Taiwan |
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Abstract: | We propose an extensive form game to give a noncooperative interpretation of the Mas-Colell bargaining set for transferable utility games. Based on the objection and counterobjection in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, a bilateral negotiation is designed in our model. We show that the equilibrium outcomes of our extensive form game coincide with the Mas-Colell bargaining set in the supperadditive environments. |
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Keywords: | C71 C72 |
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