Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: Incentives and welfare effects |
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Authors: | Rabah Amir Jim Y Jin Michael Troege |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, United States;2. University of St. Andrews, United Kingdom;3. ESCP Europe, France |
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Abstract: | Contrary to much of the existing literature, we obtain robust and clear-cut results for the incentives and welfare effects of information sharing when information is firm-specific. We show that firms’ incentives to share this type of information are aligned with social welfare. Whenever revealing information is the dominant strategy (such as for Cournot firms revealing costs or Cournot and Bertrand firms revealing demand), it is socially beneficial. Only cost information in Bertrand competition will not be revealed but this is socially desirable, too. These findings are independent of distributional assumptions on random shocks and signals and hold for general asymmetric oligopoly with any mixture of substitute, complementary and independent goods. |
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Keywords: | D82 L13 L41 |
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