Food crisis and export taxation: the cost of non-cooperative trade policies |
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Authors: | Antoine Bouët David Laborde Debucquet |
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Institution: | 1.LAREFI,Université de Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV,Pessac Cedex,France;2.Markets, Trade and Institutions Division,International Food Policy Research Institute,Washington,US |
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Abstract: | This paper aims to assess the rationales for export taxes in the context of a food crisis. First, we summarize the effects
of export taxes using both partial and general equilibrium theoretical models. When large countries aim to maintain constant
domestic food prices, in the event of an increase in world agricultural prices, the optimal response is to decrease import
tariffs in net food-importing countries and to increase export tariffs in net food-exporting countries. The latter decision
improves national welfare, while the former reduces national welfare: this is the price that must be paid to keep domestic
food prices constant. Small net food-importing countries are harmed by both decisions, while small net food-exporting countries
gain from both. Second, we illustrate the costs of a lack of regulation and cooperation surrounding such policies in a time
of crisis using a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, mimicking the mechanisms that appeared during the recent
food price surge (2006–2008). This model illustrates the interdependence of trade policies, as well as how a process of retaliation
and counter-retaliation (increased export taxes in large net food-exporting countries and reduced import tariffs in large
net food-importing countries) can contribute to successive augmentations of world agricultural prices and harm small net food-importing
countries. We conclude with a call for international regulation, in particular because small net food-importing countries
may be substantially harmed by those policies that amplify the already negative impact of a food crisis. |
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