Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation |
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Authors: | Jos Alcalde Pablo Revilla |
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Institution: | a Department de Fonaments de l’Anàlisi Econòmica, University of Alicante, Alicante E-03071, Spain;b Centr A, and Department of Economics, Pablo de Olavide University (Seville), Seville E-41013, Spain |
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Abstract: | This paper explores the existence of stable research teams, when the preferences of each agent depend on the set of researchers who are collaborating. We introduce a property over researchers’ preferences, called top responsiveness, guaranteeing the existence of stable research teams configurations. We also provide a stable mechanism, induced by the so-called top covering algorithm, which is strategy-proof when researchers preferences satisfy top responsiveness. Furthermore, we find that, in this framework, the top covering mechanism is the only strategy-proof mechanism that always selects stable allocations. |
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Keywords: | Coalition formation Research teams configurations Stability Strategy-proofness |
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