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格莱明银行模式:基于关联博弈的分析
引用本文:谢玉梅. 格莱明银行模式:基于关联博弈的分析[J]. 经济问题, 2008, 348(8)
作者姓名:谢玉梅
作者单位:江南大学,商学院,江苏,无锡,214122
摘    要:从关联博弈角度对格莱明银行模式进行了分析,认为格莱明银行小组贷款模式实现了贷款博弈与社会资本博弈的紧密结合,正是这种紧密关联博弈克服了成员贷款中的 "搭便车"行为.由于重复博弈的存在,社会资本成为一种可置信的威胁,保证了贷款协议的执行,成功克服了合约中产生的代理问题.格莱明银行模式对我国小额信贷激励机制的建立具有重要的参考价值.

关 键 词:小额信贷  小组贷款  关联博弈

A Case Study of Grameen Bank Model:Based on Linkage Game Theory
XIE Yu-mei. A Case Study of Grameen Bank Model:Based on Linkage Game Theory[J]. On Economic Problems, 2008, 348(8)
Authors:XIE Yu-mei
Affiliation:XIE Yu-mei(School of Business,Jiangnan University,Wuxi 214063,China)
Abstract:This article analyzes the microfinance model based on the liankage game theory.Grameen bank designs the group microcredit pattern which makes the credit game and social capital game together.The closed linkage game overcomes the pickup action.Because of repeated game,social capital becomes a believed threat which insures the group to enforce the credit contract and settle down the agent puzzle dom.Grameen bank model has set a good example for us how to establish an incentive microfinance mechanism.
Keywords:microfinance  group credit  linkage game  
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