加强中央银行独立性的重要意义--以日本为实例的分析

以日本为实例的分析表明,如果一国的中央银行缺乏应有的独立性,一般说来并不会像“时间非一致性”理论所分析的那样,会促使政府反反复复地背弃维护物价稳定的承诺,去有意制造通货膨胀,也不会像政治商业周期理论所分析的那样,会引发政府为谋求连任而周期性地运用货币政策愚弄选民。部分西方学者以通货膨胀率的讷氏来分析是否应该加强中央银行独立性的观点是极其片面的。为了使货币政策选择免受个别政治家或某届政府不合理的干预,避免国际压力对货币政策运营产生错误影响,使货币政策真正起到稳定经济运行的作用,必须赋予中央银行以充分的独立性。

The Importance of Strengthening the Independence of the Central Bank

As shown in the study of Japanese banks, the lack of sufficient independence on the part of a country's central bank will normally not lead to the government's repeated breaking its promise to maintain stable prices or its deliberately causing currency inflation as claimed by the analysts in their "time inconsistency" studies, neither will it cause the government to use currency policy to mislead the voting public in order to seek continuous terms of office as shown in the analysis in terms of political-commercial cycle theories. It is extremely one-sided to try and prove whether the independence of the central bank should be strengthened in terms of currency inflation rate as some of the Westerti analysts have done in their studies.In order that the choice of currency policy will not be irrationally interfered with by any individual politicians or certain government, in order that currency policy will not be adversely affected by international pressure, and so that currency policy will truly be able to play the part of economic stabilizer, the central bank must be endowed with sufficient independence.