A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires |
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Authors: | Stefano Vannucci |
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Institution: | (1) Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università di Siena, Piazza S. Francesco 7, 53100 Siena, Italy |
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Abstract: | In this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of effectivity
functions having admissible weight-profiles of assemblies as the relevant parameters. Working in a 2-jurisdiction outcome
space we show that the existence of umpires is consistent with strong core-stability of both neo-parliamentary and semi-presidential
government forms provided that the majority formation rule is collegial, namely there is one electorally fixed minimal majority
coalition.
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Keywords: | Coalitional game forms Core stability Government forms |
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