Structure,Clearinghouses and Symmetry |
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| Authors: | Martin Shubik Eric Smith |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8281, USA;(2) Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 85701, USA |
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| Abstract: | We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure |
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| Keywords: | Strategic market games Clearinghouses Credit |
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