Revenue non-equivalence between auctions with soft and hard closing mechanisms: New evidence from Yahoo! |
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Authors: | Brent Glover Yaron Raviv |
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Affiliation: | a Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, United States b Robert Day School of Economics and Finance, Claremont McKenna College, 500 E. 9th Street, Claremont, CA 91711, United States |
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Abstract: | We use a unique dataset to examine the revenue differences between auctions with a hard-close ending rule versus those with a soft-close ending rule. We find that selling items using the soft-close rule increases the selling price by an amount between $25 and $44 (or 13-20 percent) over the hard-close format. One possible theoretical explanation for these results is that the hard-close ending rule accommodates the practice of sniping, which leads to a lower expected selling price. We find empirically that a lack of experience could help to explain why, in spite of the revenue differences, some sellers select the hard-close ending rule. |
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Keywords: | D44 |
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