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Revenue non-equivalence between auctions with soft and hard closing mechanisms: New evidence from Yahoo!
Authors:Brent Glover  Yaron Raviv
Affiliation:a Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, United States
b Robert Day School of Economics and Finance, Claremont McKenna College, 500 E. 9th Street, Claremont, CA 91711, United States
Abstract:We use a unique dataset to examine the revenue differences between auctions with a hard-close ending rule versus those with a soft-close ending rule. We find that selling items using the soft-close rule increases the selling price by an amount between $25 and $44 (or 13-20 percent) over the hard-close format. One possible theoretical explanation for these results is that the hard-close ending rule accommodates the practice of sniping, which leads to a lower expected selling price. We find empirically that a lack of experience could help to explain why, in spite of the revenue differences, some sellers select the hard-close ending rule.
Keywords:D44
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