Evolution of cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas |
| |
Authors: | Marco A. Janssen Nathan D. Rollins |
| |
Affiliation: | School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, PO Box 872402, Tempe, AZ 85287-2402, United States |
| |
Abstract: | Field experiments with asymmetric commons dilemmas have shown that groups who are able to derive high social efficiency also had higher equity compared to groups who were not able to derive significant levels of social efficiency. These findings resemble the high productivity in long-lasting irrigation systems based on self-governance. We present an agent-based model based on cultural group selection that shows that the patterns observed in the field experiments can be evolved in cases where agents participate regularly in less challenging symmetric public good dilemmas. These results indicate that cooperation in asymmetric dilemmas can evolve and persist when the agents contend with other social dilemmas than the asymmetric dilemmas. |
| |
Keywords: | B52 C73 C93 Q25 Q57 |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|