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囤积居奇的反垄断问题解析
引用本文:吴清萍,忻红.囤积居奇的反垄断问题解析[J].商业经济与管理,2012(1):19-24.
作者姓名:吴清萍  忻红
作者单位:河北经贸大学商学院,河北石家庄,050061
基金项目:河北省社会科学基金项目,河北省科技厅研究与发展计划项目
摘    要:当前,对企业囤积居奇行为的规制在我国遭遇了法律适应的问题,文章认为应依据《反垄断法》对企业囤积居奇行为进行规制。根据行动企业针对的目标市场不同可以将囤积居奇行为分成掠夺性囤积居奇和提高竞争对手成本性囤积居奇两种类型,对两者进行经济学分析可以得到两类囤积居奇行为对市场竞争及消费者福利所产生的影响存在一定差异。在对企业囤积居奇行为进行反垄断规制的实践中需遵循合理原则,依从四步骤对企业囤积居奇行为进行判定。

关 键 词:囤积居奇  买方势力  反垄断规制  合理性原则

A Study on the Antitrust Issues of Overbuying
WU Qing-ping , XIN Hong.A Study on the Antitrust Issues of Overbuying[J].Business Economics and Administration,2012(1):19-24.
Authors:WU Qing-ping  XIN Hong
Institution:(Business School,Hebei University of Economics & Business,Shijiazhuang 050061,China)
Abstract:Nowadays,there is obstacle in the regulation of overbuying in China.Based on an economic analysis of overbuying,this paper proposes legal solutions.First,the corporate overbuying conduct may raise antitrust concerns under the Antitrust Law.Second,the economic analysis of overbuying distinguishes two different types of overbuying(predatory and rival cost-raising) according to their different target markets and potentially different economic impacts.Third,in practice of regulation,overbuying should be evaluated with a four-step rule of reason analysis under the basic consumer welfare standard.
Keywords:overbuying  buyer power  Antitrust Law regulation  rule of reason
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