The benefits of central bank's political independence |
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Authors: | Emmanuelle Gabillon David Martimort |
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Affiliation: | a University of Perpignan (GEREM), 52 Avenue Villeneuve, 66000 Perpignan, France b Université de Toulouse 1 (GREMAQ, IDEI), France |
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Abstract: | We consider a two-tier model of monetary policy where the central banker is both subject to the explicit influence of elected political principals through contracts and the implicit influence of interest groups willing to capture monetary policy. We analyze the impact of granting independence to the central banker on the scope for capture and the agency costs of delegating the monetary policy to a central banker. Political independence increases those agency costs but significantly stabilizes the politically induced fluctuations of inflation and improves ex ante social welfare. |
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Keywords: | D82 L51 |
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