The cournot duopoly model reconsidered in the presence of costly communication and enforcement agreements |
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Authors: | Ilan Maoz |
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Institution: | Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, 84120, Israel |
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Abstract: | Recently I proposed a general notion of equilibrium for n-person games which is based on mutual threats and promises (responses), and which leads, in general, to a determinate solution with respect to the order of choice moves. The nature of the solution set in our model is a function of the action sets, the payoff functions, and the cost of ‘communication and enforcement of agreements’ (C&E). The main concern of this paper is to show that the Cournot duopoly solution, for the case of a linear demand function facing two identical firms, can be regenerated by our solution concept under a certain assumption about a high cost C&E. On the other hand, it is shown that under a relatively low cost of C&E the Cournot/Nash solution does not belong to our solution set, because it is Pareto inferior for both duopolists relative to some solutions in our set, among them, the standard monopoly solution. |
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