论政府供给偏好的短期决定:政治均衡与经济效率

本文以财政支出为主体,研究了我国政府供给偏好(规模与结构)短期决定问题。政治均衡而非经济市场均衡是理解这一问题的关键。在“有管理的竞争性政治市场”和政府追求政治支持最大化等假定下,我们考察了政治均衡决定政府供给偏好的过程及其效率属性,以及“政治价格”在两级“政治市场”上的形成机制。结论表明:政治均衡决定资源配置固有的低效率属性,因政府供给范围的“越位”和“缺位”而加剧。当前改革的重点应是推动经济市场化转轨的完成和公共财政的转型,而非完全的民主化。权威因素对“政治价格”的管理在利益分化严重的当前形势下具有建设性作用。推动渐进民主化,完善权力对等的“二级政治市场”则是长远之策。

Short-term Determination of Government Supply Preference:Political Equilibrium and Economic Efficiency

This paper discusses the short-term determining mechanism of China's government supply preference.Political but not economic market equilibrium is the key to understand it. Under the assumption of managed competitive political market and political support maximizing government, the political determination process, its efficiency character, and the political price formation mechanism are investigated respectively. The low efficiency nature of political allocation is aggravated for offside and absence of government activities. Current reforms should focus on promotion of market-oriented economic transition and public finance transformation, but not overall democratization.Management of political prices by authority will play a constructive role in the transition period. While gradual democratization and the building of competitive political market based on equal political rights are farsighted choices.