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城中村改造中参与主体的博弈分析与对策建议
引用本文:张晶.城中村改造中参与主体的博弈分析与对策建议[J].改革与战略,2008,24(4):82-86.
作者姓名:张晶
作者单位:西安建筑科技大学管理学院,陕西,西安,710055
摘    要:城中村问题己经成为影响我国城市协调发展、功能提升和市民生活质量进一步改善的梗阻。文章在前人研究的基础上,运用博弈理论研究城中村改造中政府、开发商、村民的三方博弈过程,通过构造效用函数分析参与主体之间的利益冲突,提出在村民支持的基础上政府介入并承担改造费用,原则上不鼓励开发商介入改造的对策建议。

关 键 词:城中村改造  博弈论  效用函数
文章编号:1002-736X(2008)04-0082-05

Benefit Conflicts in the Reconstruction of theVillage in City
Zhang Jing.Benefit Conflicts in the Reconstruction of theVillage in City[J].Reformation & Strategy,2008,24(4):82-86.
Authors:Zhang Jing
Institution:Zhang Jing (School of Management,Xi'an University of Architecture , Technology,Xi'an,Shannxi 710055)
Abstract:Village in cityhas become an obstacle of the city coordinated development,function promotion and citizen's life quality improvement.Based on the previous research,by using the game theory,the benefit conflicts among government,developer and villagers are studied.By analyzing the benefits conflicts through utility functions,it is concluded that the reforming cost should be paid by the government on the villagers' supports and the developers should not be involved in the reforming in principle.
Keywords:reconstruction of thevillage in city  game theory  utility functions  
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