| 从博弈论视角透析见义勇为的立法路径 |
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| 引用本文： | 王俊.从博弈论视角透析见义勇为的立法路径[J].广东商学院学报,2010,25(2):84-88. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王俊 |
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| 作者单位： | 西南大学法学院,重庆,400716 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用博弈论的分析方法,从微观层面构建潜在见义勇为者的理性选择模型,解释了潜在见义勇为者选择见危不救这一次优策略的原因。以此为基础,探求如何通过激励机制和风险保障两方面的立法来促使潜在见义勇为者的决策向见义勇为这一最优策略转变,推动更多的人积极主动地见义勇为。
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| 关 键 词： | 见义勇为 博弈论 法律激励 法律保障 |
On the Legislation of Good Samaritan from the Perspective of Game Theory |
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| WANG Jun.On the Legislation of Good Samaritan from the Perspective of Game Theory[J].Journal of Guangdong Business College,2010,25(2):84-88. |
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| Authors: | WANG Jun |
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| Institution: | WANG Jun(School of Law,Southwest University,Chongqing 400716,China) |
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| Abstract: | This paper utilizes the method of game theory to construct the rational choice model of potential good Samaritan,explaining why the potential good Samaritan chooses the suboptimal strategy not to save in front of the danger.Based on the above analysis,the paper further explores how to motivate more and more people to adopt the optimal strategy to help others in a just cause through establishing the legislation from two aspects,namely encouraging mechanism and risk prevention mechanism. |
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| Keywords: | good Samaritan game theory legal incentives legal protection |
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