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An experimental test of a committee search model
Institution:1. Bren School, 4410 Bren Hall, UC Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93117, United States;2. CNRS UMR5474 LAMETA, Montpellier F-34000, France;3. Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Aix-Marseille University, CNRS & EHESS, Centre de la Vieille Charité, 2 rue de la charité, Marseille F-13002, France;4. NBER, United States;1. Durham University Business School, Durham University, Durham DH1 3LB, United Kingdom;2. Department of Economics, Monash Business School, Clayton, VIC 3800, Australia;3. Department of Economics, Bo?aziçi University, Bebek, Istanbul TR-34342, Turkey
Abstract:The objective of this paper is to design a laboratory experiment for an infinite-horizon sequential committee search model in order to test some of the implications obtained by the model in Albrecht et al. (2010) (AAV). We find that, compared with single-agent search, the search duration is longer for committee search under the unanimity rule, but is shorter for committee search in which at least one vote is required to stop searching. In addition, according to estimates from round-based search decisions, subjects are more likely to vote to stop searching in committee search than in single-agent search. This confirms that agents are less picky in committee search. Overall, the experimental outcomes are consistent with the implications suggested by the AAV model. However, despite the prediction from the AAV model, we could not obtain a significant outcome in relation to the size order of the probabilities of voting to stop searching in committee search for the various plurality voting rules.
Keywords:Experiments  Committee search  Plurality voting rules
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