Referenda Under Oath |
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Authors: | Nicolas Jacquemet Alexander James Stéphane Luchini Jason F Shogren |
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Institution: | 1.Paris School of Economics,Université de Lorraine (BETA),Nancy,France;2.Department of Economics and Public Policy,University of Alaska Anchorage,Anchorage,USA;3.Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics),CNRS and EHESS, Centre de la Vieille Charité,Marseille Cedex 02,France;4.Department of Economics and Finance,University of Wyoming,Laramie,USA |
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Abstract: | Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond. |
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