| 基于声誉约束的民间金融组织动态博弈及其风险防范 |
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| 引用本文： | 张振东.基于声誉约束的民间金融组织动态博弈及其风险防范[J].经济经纬,2010(1). |
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| 作者姓名： | 张振东 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学,经济与金融学院,陕西,西安,710061 |
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| 摘 要： | 民间金融组织的设立来自于发起者承诺的高收益和参与者期望的高回报,这是一个双方博弈的过程。发起者违约惩罚的贴现值和合约执行成本是民间金融组织能否顺畅运行的主要因素。
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| 关 键 词： | 声誉 民间金融组织风险 发起者 参与者 动态博弈 |
Dynamic Games in Informal Financial Organizations and Prevention of Risks Based on Reputation Restriction |
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| ZHANG Zhen-dong.Dynamic Games in Informal Financial Organizations and Prevention of Risks Based on Reputation Restriction[J].Economic Survey,2010(1). |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Zhen-dong |
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| Institution: | School of Economics and Finance;Xi'an Jiaotong University;Xi'an 710061;China |
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| Abstract: | The initiation of informal financial organization originates from the high return promise of initiators and the participants' expectation of high return and it is a process of games between the two parties.The discount value of penalty of violators and the cost of agreement execution are the main factors determining whether informal financial organizations can run smoothly. |
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| Keywords: | reputation risk of informal financial organization initiator participant dynamic game |
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