| 基于信息不对称的国有企业成本控制探讨 |
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| 引用本文： | 谢光华,徐俊. 基于信息不对称的国有企业成本控制探讨[J]. 财会通讯, 2004, 0(10) |
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| 作者姓名： | 谢光华 徐俊 |
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| 作者单位： | 长江大学管理学院，中石化江汉油田分公司 湖北 荆州 434023，湖北 潜江 433121 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文以委托——代理理论的概念和基本模型为基础,探讨了成本控制中存在的委托—代理关系以及与一般模型的不同之处。然后从企业制度和信息不对称的角度对国有企业成本控制的问题进行了分析,提出国有企业成本控制问题的关键在于建立现代企业制度,变革现有的成本考核方式。
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| 关 键 词： | 信息不对称 委托-代理理论 成本控制 企业制度 |
A Discussion on The State-run Enterprise Cost Control Based on Information Asymmetry |
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| Xie Guanghua Xu Jun. A Discussion on The State-run Enterprise Cost Control Based on Information Asymmetry[J]. Communication of Finance and Accounting, 2004, 0(10) |
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| Authors: | Xie Guanghua Xu Jun |
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| Abstract: | Based on the basic concept and model of principle-agent theory, this article discussed the difference between the model in cost-controlling problem and common principle-agent model, and then analyzed the cost-controlling problem in state-owned enterprises from the viewpoints of asymmetry of informatioa Last this article concluded that the key to the cost-controlling problem of stated-owned enterprises is to establish the modern enterprises-system and regenerate the existing cost-assessing method. |
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| Keywords: | Asymmetry of information Principle-agent theory Cost-controlling Enterprises system |
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