| 劳动福利政策的经济学分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 鲁国强.劳动福利政策的经济学分析[J].经济与管理,2008,22(4):9-13. |
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| 作者姓名： | 鲁国强 |
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| 作者单位： | 深圳大学,经济学院,广东,深圳,518060 |
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| 摘 要： | 旨在造福广大劳动者的劳动福利政策，实质上由劳资双方共同负担，某种情况下其对劳动者工资和就业的回挫效应还很大。劳动福利政策可行与否，取决于所产生的社会福利增加与成本之间的比较。若带来的社会福利超过社会成本，就可推行，社会感受到的福利越大，则该政策推行的必要性越大，反之则宜慎行。
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| 关 键 词： | 劳动福利政策 带薪休假 无固定期限劳动合同 社会福利 回挫效应 无谓损失 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-3890(2008)04-0009-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2008年2月29日 |
Economical Analysis on the Employee Benefit Regulations |
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| Lu Guoqiang.Economical Analysis on the Employee Benefit Regulations[J].Economy and Management,2008,22(4):9-13. |
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| Authors: | Lu Guoqiang |
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| Institution: | Lu Guoqiang (Business School, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, China) |
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| Abstract: | No matter formally the money is taken out from which side's pocket,both the manager and the employee share the burden of the employee benefit measurements.Whether the employee benefit policy is viable or not depends upon the tradeoff between the social welfare it brings and the social cost it entails.It is viable if the former outperforms the latter.The more the former,the better the policy,and vice versa. |
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| Keywords: | employee benefit regulation paid time off minimum severance package social welfare backfiring effect deadweight loss |
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