The powerless yet relevant third: a three-player ultimatum/dictator game with earned funds and roles |
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Authors: | Jason Childs Alexander Siebert |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Regina, Regina, Canada;2. Department of Economics, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, USA |
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Abstract: | We report the first experiment to pair a three-player ultimatum/dictator game with a real effort task. The inclusion of the real effort task shifts the standard for division from simple egalitarianism towards relative performance; even in treatments in which roles and funds are exogenous. Additionally, we find proposers overcompensate themselves relative to their effort, and this additional compensation comes at the expense of powerless (third) players. Individual characteristics predict the nature of a proposals. Lastly, we find that responders’ choice to accept is based on their own and the powerless third party’s compensation. |
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Keywords: | Equity bargaining experiment three-player game |
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