研发合作中的产权结构与投资激励

不完全合同背景下，产权分配在参与方的投资决策中至关重要。利用产权理论讨论了研发合作中的序贯投资决策和创新的产权分配问题。研究表明，最优产权结构随着参与方的谈判力变动，谈判力较低的一方单独拥有产权能够平衡其投资积极性；随着投资关系专用性程度的增加，最优产权为联合产权在产品开发者谈判力区间的范围更广。为了提高双方合作效率，可考虑采用由一个产品开发者出价并按照研究单位投资积极性分配初始产权的期权合同。比较分析发现：期权合同能够缓解投资不足问题，并进一步提高双方合作效率。

The Research of Ownership Structure and Investment Incentive in R&D Partnership

In an environment with contractual incompleteness,ownership allocation is important in the R&D partnership.This paper uses the property right approach to explore the ownership structure of innovation and investment decision in a scenario where two parties invest sequentially.The results show that optimal ownership structure varies with bargaining power,and sole ownership by the parties whose bargaining power is relative low can balance their investment incentive.The range of joint ownership based on marketer's bargaining power is increase with relationship-specificity.For an efficiency improvement,we consider an option contract that allocates the ownership according the researcher's investment incentive initially,and the marketer has the right to make the offer of option price.The results of comparisons show that option contract can mitigate underinvestment problem to improve the total surplus.