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Dominant shareholders,corporate boards,and corporate value: A cross-country analysis
Authors:Jay Dahya  Orlin Dimitrov  John J McConnell
Institution:1. Baruch College, The City University of New York, NY 10031, USA;2. School of Business, American University of Bulgaria, Blagoevgrad 2700, Bulgaria;3. Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907, USA
Abstract:We investigate the relation between corporate value and the proportion of the board made up of independent directors in 799 firms with a dominant shareholder across 22 countries. We find a positive relation, especially in countries with weak legal protection for shareholders. The findings suggest that a dominant shareholder, were he so inclined, could offset, at least in part, the documented value discount associated with weak country-level shareholder protection by appointing an ‘independent’ board. The cost to the dominant shareholder of doing so is the loss in perquisites associated with being a dominant shareholder. Thus, not all dominant shareholders choose independent boards.
Keywords:G30  G34
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