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An agency theory of the bankruptcy law

Institution:	1. Department of Finance, TransWorld University, No. 1221, Zhennan Rd., Douliu City, Yunlin County 640, Taiwan, ROC;2. Department of Finance, National Yunlin University of Science & Technology, Yunlin, Taiwan, ROC;1. ZenTra – Center for Transnational Studies, Department of Business Administration, Economics, and Law, Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg, D-26111 Oldenburg, Germany;2. Concordia University, John Molson School of Business, Department of Finance, Canada;3. Université du Luxembourg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, Luxembourg

Abstract:	What is the purpose of bankruptcy law? Existing views focus on the need of coordinating creditors' conflicting claims. In this paper the authors argue that the bankruptcy law helps reduce agency costs in financially distressed firms by forcing managers to disclose information on the viability of the firm. The authors' theory explains a number of empirical observations of financial distress that cannot easily be explained by existing theories of bankruptcy law.

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