Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic firms |
| |
Authors: | Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz María Begoña Garzón |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83, 48015, Bilbao, Spain
|
| |
Abstract: | An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed market where a firm jointly owned by the public sector and private domestic shareholders (a semipublic firm) competes with n private firms. We show that there is an equilibrium in which firms take production decisions simultaneously. This result is strikingly different from that obtained by Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998), who shows that when a public firm competes with n private firms all firms producing simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome. Our result differs from that of Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) for two reasons: firstly, we consider that there is a semipublic firm rather than a public firm. Secondly, Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) considers that the public firm is less efficient than private firms while in our paper all firms are equally efficient. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|