Venture capital in transition: A Monte-Carlo simulation of changes in investment patterns

This article examines the nature of the investment process which has historically generated high returns for venture capital funds, and the impact on fund returns of perceived changes in management practice and the structure of the industry. The article outlines some policy implications for fund managers, investors, and the general management of corporations.The authors have investigated the investment process and the changes in the nature of the process through the use of a Monte-Carlo simulation model. Information gathered from interviews with fund managers and the available published data on venture fund performance (including proprietary surveys) was used to develop and calibrate the model. The model replicates the relatively high average fund returns and distribution of returns for funds through the early 1980s. The model simulates a multistaged investment process which draws on a pool of investment opportunities which have a log normal distribution of returns and a low (zero) average return. The model readily permits the exploration of the impact of management and industry practices on fund returns.The conditions identified by the authors, which led to high rates of return on the part of venture capital funds, include:

• 1.1) multistaged investment or commitment of funds on an incremental basis with evaluation of venture performance before commitment of additional fund;
• 2.2) objective evaluation of venture performance with the clear distinguishing of winners from losers;
• 3.3) parlaying funds or having the confidence to commit further funds to ventures identified as winners;
• 4.4) persistence of returns from one round to the next, which implies that valuable information is gained from previous rounds of investment in the same venture;
• 5.5) long-term holding of investment portfolios for a period sufficient for geometric averaging of compound returns to cause the winners to “take over” or raise portfolio returns.

Taken together, these conditions have permitted venture capital funds to historically realize strong average returns with a few of them realizing extraordinary returns.The article also explores the consequences of what some believe is happening in the industry: a trend toward holding investments for shorter periods, increased competition both for investments and later in the product-market arena, and a growing lack of loyalty between investors and investees. All of these conditions and their indirect consequences were shown by the model to negatively impact the limited partners in the venture capital funds while general partners, given the structure of fees and the distribution of investment returns, generally realized a reasonable to extraordinary return. The article outlines a number of management and investment policy implications for investors and fund managers.