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Overbidding in fixed rate tenders—an empirical assessment of alternative explanations
Authors:Dieter Nautz,Jö  rg Oechssler
Affiliation:a School of Business and Economics, Department of Money and Macroeconomics, Goethe-University Frankfurt, Mertonstr 17, 60054 Frankfurt, Germany
b Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Grabengasse 14, 69117 Heidelberg, Germany
Abstract:This paper investigates various theories explaining banks’ overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbidding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed at neutralizing interest rate expectations, would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged.
Keywords:E52   D44
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