基于有限理性的农业巨灾保险主体行为分析及优化

基于有限理性的进化博弈分析框架,本文分析了农业巨灾保险主体群落基因复制动态变化过程。研究发现,农民个体是否购买农业巨灾保险关键取决于个体的比较预期收益和其所要承担选择成本的大小。而保险公司与投保农民的博弈轨迹不存在使博弈双方共同稳定的进化稳定策略,只能实现农业巨灾保险市场上平均意义上较优策略。同时,由于农业巨灾风险强破坏性和发生概率分布厚尾性的影响,政府的有效行为具有优化农业巨灾保险主体行为变迁轨迹的效能。

Analysis and optimization of behaviors of agricultural catastrophe entities based on limited rationality

Based on the evolution game analysis framework with limited rationality,the paper analyzed the dynamic genetic reproduction process for the agricultural catastrophe entities.It unveiled that whether farmers purchased agricultural catastrophe insurance depended on their comparison of the expected return and costs.The track of game between insurers and insurance applying farmers didn't conform to the evolution stabilization strategy for both parties,but it could achieve a relatively better strategy in the agr...