碳交易和绿色补贴政策下的低碳供应链最优决策与协调

考虑政府的碳交易管制和绿色补贴政策,针对由政府、单个制造商和单个零售商组成的三级低碳供应链,运用博弈理论建立了政府主导下的三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型和集中决策模型。重点分析了消费者绿色偏好、碳交易价格和减排成本系数对低碳供应链最优决策和社会福利水平的影响。利用两部收费契约和低价促销策略分别对所建模型进行了协调研究,并利用数值算例对文中结论进行了验证。研究发现:较强的消费者绿色偏好有利于提高产品的绿色度、渠道成员的利润和供应链的社会福利水平；产品的绿色度和供应链的社会福利水平在集中决策模型下最高而在分散决策模型下较低；政府的最优绿色投资补贴率在消费者绿色偏好程度较强时降低而在碳减排难度较大时上升；在参数满足一定条件下,两部定价契约和低价促销策略可实现低碳供应链的完美协调。

Optimal decisions and coordination of low-carbon supply chain under cap-and-trade regulation and government subsidy

This paper establishes three-stage Stackelberg game models and one centralized decision model considering the cap-and-trade regulation and government green subsidy policies in a three-level low-carbon supply chain composed of the government, one manufacturer and one retailer. The influences of the consumer’s green preference, carbon trading price, carbon reduction cost coefficient on the optimal decisions and social welfare levels of different channel power models are analyzed. In addition, the proposed game models are coordinated by using two-part tariff contract and low-price promotion strategy respectively. Numerical examples are conducted to verify the derived conclusions. The results indicate that: Strong consumer green preference is beneficial for improving product greenness, channel members’ profits, and the whole supply chain’s social welfare. The greenness of the product and the level of social welfare in the supply chain are highest under the centralized decision model and lower in the decentralized decision models. The optimal green investment subsidy rate of the government decreases when consumer green preference is strong and increases when carbon emission reduction is more difficult. When the parameter values satisfy certain conditions, the perfect coordination of the low-carbon supply chain can be achieved be means of two-part tariff contract and low-price promotion strategy.