| 自利行为下我国遭遇反倾销诉讼原因的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 陶娟,孙本芝.自利行为下我国遭遇反倾销诉讼原因的博弈分析[J].江苏商论,2013(6):35-37,65. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陶娟 孙本芝 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京工业大学经济管理学院,江苏南京211816 |
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| 基金项目： | 江苏省社会科学基金项目“江苏制造业攀升价值链高端的关键措施研究”（11EYD031）研究成果 |
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| 摘 要： | 自上世纪90年代以来我国一直是美欧等西方发达国家反倾销的重点国家,这引起了我国学者对于倾销与反倾销的广泛研究。本文从自利行为角度对国企出口遭遇反倾销进行探讨。通过模型建构,得出结论:由于信息的不完全性,这使得进口方更容易错误地认为出口方有倾销行为。
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| 关 键 词： | 自利行为 Cournot双寡头垄断博弈 反倾销 建议 |
Game Analysis of China Suffered from Anti-dumping Causes of Action under the Self-interested Behavior |
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| Tao Juan,Sun Ben-zhi.Game Analysis of China Suffered from Anti-dumping Causes of Action under the Self-interested Behavior[J].Jiangsu Commercial Forum,2013(6):35-37,65. |
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| Authors: | Tao Juan Sun Ben-zhi |
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| Institution: | (Nanjing University of Technology,School of Economics and Management,Nanjing 211816,China) |
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| Abstract: | This paper sees exporters as a game party and importers as another game party under the self-interested behavior,and forms a Cournot duopoly monopoly game model.Through this model we get the complete information static game of Cournot Nash equilibrium and incomplete information Cournot Bayesian equilibrium.Compared to the complete information,we find it easier for import party to think that exports are having dumping behavior in incomplete information. |
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| Keywords: | Self-interested Behavior Cournot duopoly monopoly game model anti-dumping suggestions |
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