| 经济适用房建设中地方政府与中央政府的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 尚宇梅.经济适用房建设中地方政府与中央政府的博弈分析[J].商业研究,2007(10):130-132. |
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| 作者姓名： | 尚宇梅 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安财经学院,建筑经济管理系,陕西,西安,710061 |
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| 摘 要： | 经济适用房由于建设用地划拨、政策的不完善、退出机制的不健全、居民住房档案和收入信息系统不健全而无法准确界定住房保障对象等原因,使得地方政府由于局部利益的诱惑,以中央政府的行为预期作为自己行为的出发点,存在与中央政府的博弈。
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| 关 键 词： | 经济适用房 地方政府 中央政府 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148X（2007）10-0130-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-12-28 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年12月28 |
The Game Between Local Governments and Central Government in the Construction of Economical Houses |
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| SHANG Yu-mei.The Game Between Local Governments and Central Government in the Construction of Economical Houses[J].Commercial Research,2007(10):130-132. |
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| Authors: | SHANG Yu-mei |
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| Abstract: | There are many causes in the construction of economical houses, such as ill allocation and policies in construction land, unhealthy drawback mechanism, the lack of inhabitant housing archive and income information system. These analyses may lead to a game between local governments and the central government for their respective interests. |
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| Keywords: | economical houses local governments central government game |
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