资源诅咒:一个新兴古典经济学框架

本文从分工这一角度出发,在一个包含偷抢的新兴古典经济学框架下分析自然资源对经济增长的效应,内生化了资源诅咒假说.分析表明,丰富的人均资源本身会提高分工的门槛,使得人们难以形成有效的分工结构,从而抑制经济增长.另外,由于资源丰富国家往往伴随高的偷抢水平,这也降低了分工合作的可能性及其经济绩效.本文的政策含义是,为了避免资源诅咒效应,必须打破现存的资源依赖格局,构建良好的制度基础,实现分工深化以促进经济增长.

Resource Curse:a Framework of Neo Classical Economics

This paper studies the natural resource curse under a framework of neo classical economics.Our analysis shows that the natural resources have negative effect on the division of labor,and the steal cost coefficient decided by the social institution has a vital effect on the transaction efficiency,the lower the steal cost coefficient is,the harder the structure of labor division can be formed.The policy implication of this paper is that efficient institutions will make the division of labor easier and the resource curse will be hold back.