| 基于控制权的管理者晋升机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 曹慧,. 基于控制权的管理者晋升机制研究[J]. 华东经济管理, 2010, 24(8): 119-121. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-5097.2010.08.028 |
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| 作者姓名： | 曹慧 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京城市学院,经济管理学部,北京,100083 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章在委托—代理理论的分析框架下,将管理者的行为划分成两类：一是增加企业产出的生产性行为;二是增加自身控制权的行为。然后引入控制权变量,建立了股东效用最大化模型,求出了管理者晋升后的最优报酬契约,为企业设计有效的晋升机制提供了理论依据。
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| 关 键 词： | 管理者 控制权 晋升 激励 委托-代理 |
A Study on Managers Promotion Mechanism Based on Control Rights |
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| CAO Hui. A Study on Managers Promotion Mechanism Based on Control Rights[J]. East China Economic Management, 2010, 24(8): 119-121. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-5097.2010.08.028 |
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| Authors: | CAO Hui |
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| Affiliation: | School of Economics and Management; Beijing City University; Beijing 100083; China |
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| Abstract: | Based on the principal-agent theory,the paper divides managers behaviors into productive behavior and behavior of increasing benefits of control rights.Then,it adds the variable of control rights to build a model of maximizing shareholders utility.Finally,the paper concludes an optimal managers compensation contract.It is useful for designing an effective promotion mechanism in enterprises. |
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| Keywords: | managers control rights promotion incentive principal-agent |
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