Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) |
| |
Authors: | Bettina Klaus Flip Klijn Jordi Massó |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200, MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands;(2) Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain;(3) CODE and Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain |
| |
Abstract: | In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson in Am Econ Rev 89:748–780, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when couples’ preferences are ‘responsive’, i.e., when Gale and Shapley’s (Am Math Monthly 69:9–15, 1962) deferred acceptance algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Second, we demonstrate that the new NRMP algorithm may also be anipulated by couples acting as singles. |
| |
Keywords: | Matching Stability Couples |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|