| 考研、留学热背后的信息经济学解释 |
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| 引用本文： | 李少敏. 考研、留学热背后的信息经济学解释[J]. 商业研究, 2003, 0(10): 131-133 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李少敏 |
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| 作者单位： | 中山大学,岭南学院,广东,广州,510275 |
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| 摘 要： | 用一个简单的信息经济学模型 ,来表明学历在劳动力市场上的信号示意作用。如果在本科的学历下 ,能力低的工人和能力高的工人混同在一起 ,得到相同的报酬。为了区分自己 ,能力高的工人通过考研 ,留学等提高自己的学历 ,向雇主传递更强的信号 ,从而获得更高的回报。
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| 关 键 词： | 信号示意 信息不对称 考研 留学 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148X(2003)10-0131-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002-05-12 |
The Explanation From Information Economics of Continual & Overseas Study Trend |
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| Abstract: | The paper emphasizes the signaling effect of education degree in labour market through a simple model of information economics. With a bachelor degree, the employees with higher ability mix with the employees with lower ability and get the same salary. In order to distinguish themselves, the ones with higher ability decide to increase their education degree through taking graduate student examination or continuing further study abroad, so they could be known better by their employers and get higher salary. |
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| Keywords: | signaling asymmetric information further study abroad |
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