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Kantian Equilibrium
Authors:John E Roemer
Institution:Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520, USA
Abstract:Consider a game whose strategies are "contributions". A strategy profile is a Kantian equilibrium if  no  player would like  all  players to alter their contributions by the  same multiplicative factor.  Kantian equilibria are Pareto efficient. We characterize the allocation rules on several domains of environments that can be implemented as Kantian equilibria. The concept unifies the  proportional solution  on production economies and the  linear cost-share equilibrium  on public-good economies. We study Kantian equilibrium in the prisoner's dilemma, in a voting problem, and in a political economy where redistribution is the issue. The Kantian dictum engenders considerable but not unqualified cooperation.
Keywords:Kantian equilibrium  implementation  proportional solution  cost-share solution  prisoner's dilemma  voting paradox  redistributive taxation
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