Diligence and laziness in the Chinese countryside revisited |
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| Institution: | 1. University of California, Los Angeles, Anderson School of Management, Office C515, 110 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90403, United States;2. Columbia University, Department of Economics, 420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027, United States;1. China Center for Land Policy Research, Nanjing Agricultural University, PR China;2. Development Economics Group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands;3. School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, PR China |
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| Abstract: | A game-theoretic model is used to asses the impact of changing disutility of labour and distribution schemes on labour supply in Chinese agricultural product teams. It is argued that a previous analysis of the problem by chinn (1980) overlooks some inherent complications. It is shown that application of the symmetric, pure strategy Nash equilibrium concept yields no equilibria over a significant range of values for relevant variables. Asymmetric, pure strategy equilibria are shown to exist over this range. Allowing production teams continuous choice of labour inputs restores symmetric equilibrium. |
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