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基于道德风险的校企合作创新序列机制设计:一种不可再协商契约的视角
引用本文:皮星,孟卫东,黄波.基于道德风险的校企合作创新序列机制设计:一种不可再协商契约的视角[J].科技进步与对策,2010,27(7):17-21.
作者姓名:皮星  孟卫东  黄波
作者单位:重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;第三军医大学人文社科学院;
基金项目:国家社会科学基金重点项目(08AJY028);;教育部高等学校博士学科点基金项目(200806110003)
摘    要:在不可再协商契约条件下,通过设计契约中的序列机制,实现校企合作双方真实披露其私人信息,从而减少机会主义行为,促使研发投资达到最优。合作创新序列机制能够提供诱因(或威胁),促使双方自觉放弃投机行为,产生有效的交易结果,使双方的专用资产投资达到最优水平。

关 键 词:道德风险  合作创新  私人信息  专用资产投资  不可再协商契约  序列机制  

Design of Sequential Mechanism for University-Enterprise Cooperative Innovation Based on Moral Hazard:From a Non-Renegotiation Contract Perspective
Pi Xing,Meng Weidong ,Huang Bo.Design of Sequential Mechanism for University-Enterprise Cooperative Innovation Based on Moral Hazard:From a Non-Renegotiation Contract Perspective[J].Science & Technology Progress and Policy,2010,27(7):17-21.
Authors:Pi Xing    Meng Weidong  Huang Bo
Institution:1.School of Economy and Business Administration/a>;Chongqing University/a>;Chongqing 400044/a>;China/a>;2.School of Humanities and Social Sciences/a>;Third Military Medical University/a>;Chongqing 400038/a>;China
Abstract:It is studied that how to design equential mechanism of contract in the non-renegotiation conditions,making university and enterprise disclose their true private information,reducing opportunistic behavior,and promoting the R&D investment to optimum.Sequential mechanism can provide incentives(or threat) to allow both sides to give up their opportunistic behavior,lead to a effective result of transaction,promote the investment of specific assets to optimum for university and enterprise.
Keywords:Moral Hazard  Cooperative innovation  Private Information  Relationship-specific investment  Non-Renegotiate Contract  Sequential mechanism  
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