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Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis*
Authors:James W Albrecht  Jan C Van Ours
Abstract:This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used. We thus reject the hypothesis that education is not used as a signal in the hiring process.
Keywords:Recruitment  signaling  I20
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